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Introduction 
 
 
The Failure of the Transitional Process 
in Yemen 
The Houthi’s Violent Rise to Power and the Fragmentation of the State 
Mareike Transfeld 
On 22 January 2015 the Yemeni president and government resigned in protest at their 
own political powerlessness. The transitional process initiated in 2011 has failed. The 
Houthis, a rebel movement from northern Yemen, reject the federal division of the 
country as stipulated in the draft constitution of January 2015, and have seized control 
of state institutions by force of arms. Opposition to the movement is growing, particu-
larly in central and southern Yemen. Meanwhile Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP) risks gaining in strength. Germany and its European partners must urge all par-
ties to the conflict to find a political solution, in an effort to counteract the ongoing 
fragmentation of the State and prevent further escalation of the violence. 
 
On 17 January 2015 the Yemeni govern-
ment published a draft constitution, which 
had emerged from the transitional process 
backed by the United Nations (UN). Follow-
ing its publication, there were heavy clashes 
between Houthi rebels and government 
forces on 19 January, with especially fierce 
fighting over the presidential palace in 
Sanaa. The intention of the Houthis, who 
are officially known as Ansarullah (Parti-
sans of God), was to force through changes 
to the constitution by escalating their use 
of violence. They categorically reject a key 
provision of the draft constitution, namely 
the division of Yemen into six federal 
regions. 
This presented President Abdrabbuh 
Mansour Hadi with a dilemma. Any con-
cessions to the Houthis would not only have 
nullified the achievements of the transi-
tional process, they would also have entire-
ly delegitimized the government. However, 
had he rejected the Houthis’ demands, he 
would have provoked further violence. 
A referendum on the new constitution, 
to be held this spring along with presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections, was meant 
to conclude the transitional process, which 
is supported by the UN, the European Union 
(EU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
The transition had been initiated in Novem-
ber 2011, after a ten-month-long national 
uprising against the then-president Ali 
Abdullah Saleh. At the time, the GCC had 
mediated an agreement which was signed 
by the then-ruling General People’s Con-
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gress (GPC) and an alliance of opposition 
parties consisting primarily of the Yemeni 
Socialist Party and the Islah party (a large 
proportion of which is actually the Muslim 
Brotherhood). In December 2011 a National 
Unity Government was formed in equal 
parts of members of the former ruling party 
and the opposition alliance. Former vice 
president Hadi was elected president for 
the period of transition. There was no rival 
candidate. 
The federal structure 
The so-called National Dialogue Conference 
(NDC) was held from March 2013 to January 
2014, providing a platform for various politi-
cal and social groups to discuss political 
reform, a new state structure, and efforts 
to settle the internal conflicts. One crucial 
result of this conference was its vote for a 
federal structure dividing the country into 
six regions. It was hoped that this would 
solve existing conflicts, especially those 
with the separatist movement in southern 
Yemen and the Houthis in the North. 
However, there was no consensus on the 
outcome among conference delegates. The 
representatives of the political parties, 
Houthis and separatist movement were 
unable to agree into how many regions 
Yemen should be divided. As a result, Hadi 
entrusted a separate commission with 
clarifying the issue, which pronounced 
itself in favour of a six-region solution. This 
vote in turn formed the basis for the draft 
constitution presented in January. When 
the commission’s decision was made pub-
lic, the Houthis responded by violently 
expanding their control over northern 
Yemen. Initially, their discontent had been 
focussed solely on the region intended for 
them, since it would have kept them iso-
lated and without access to the sea. How-
ever, in the course of their subsequent 
ascent it has become increasingly clear that 
they now lay claim to the entire country. 
The rise of the Houthis 
The Houthis have their roots in northern 
Yemen, close to the Saudi Arabian border. 
They emerged from a movement that 
formed in the 1990s to defend the religious 
traditions of the Zaidis against the incor-
poration of Sunni practices promoted by 
the central government. The Houthis’ 
hostility was motivated by concerns about 
protecting their specific identity, by their 
discontent with the role of the Yemeni gov-
ernment in the war on terror, and by the 
general political and economic marginali-
zation of their remote northern region. 
From 2004 and 2010 they were openly at 
war with the government, a conflict that 
created substantial refugee flows – in 
July 2010 around 340,000 refugees were 
recorded. In 2011 the Houthi movement 
joined the protests against the regime. 
Current events are a continuation of the 
Houthis’ previous activities, which has seen 
them rely on protests as well as armed con-
frontations since 2014. In September 2014 
Houthi fighters captured the capital and 
occupied central state institutions includ-
ing the army headquarters and state tele-
vision. On 21 September a provisional halt 
was called to the armed clashes after the gov-
ernment and Houthi movement had signed 
the so-called Peace and National Partnership 
Agreement. 
The Agreement was meant to put an end 
to the Houthi campaign of violence and at 
the same time enable progress in the tran-
sitional process. Along with transparency, 
economic reforms, and a war on corruption, 
the Houthis demanded the formation of an 
inclusive government that would also com-
prise representatives of the Southern sepa-
ratist movement (Hirak). 
Hirak is a fragmented movement that 
has been demanding the creation of an 
independent state in the South since 2009. 
The population of the formerly independ-
ent South has felt politically and economi-
cally disadvantaged compared to the North 
ever since the two parts of the country 
were united. The transitional process did 
not genuinely address Hirak’s demands, 
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namely, the release of political prisoners, a 
solution to land conflicts, and the creation 
of a united region in the South as a poten-
tial precursor to full independence. 
Hirak appeared to be the loser of the 
transition. The fact that the Houthis backed 
not just transparency and economic reforms, 
but also the inclusion of Hirak in govern-
ment, brought them legitimacy among 
Yemenis, who are hoping for a fully partici-
patory system. However, the Houthis see 
Hirak’s participation in a central govern-
ment as a possibility for sidestepping that 
movement’s demand for its own federal 
region. 
The Houthis’ armed campaign was pri-
marily motivated by the shortfalls of the 
transition process initiated in 2011. They 
had been excluded from both the negotia-
tions on the GCC-mediated agreement and 
the creation of the 2011 government (as had 
Hirak). Their influence on the transforma-
tion of Yemen was thus marginal. The move-
ment was not in fact represented until the 
Dialogue Conference. 
Resentment over the six-region solution, 
which also ran strong in ex-president Saleh’s 
People’s Congress and in Hirak, played into 
the Houthis’ hands as much as did the gov-
ernment’s failure to act. The Hadi govern-
ment did not implement reforms, nor did 
it combat corruption. As of early 2014, with 
the security situation and economy deterio-
rating, and the government losing its legiti-
macy, the Houthis were able to mobilize 
parts of the population against it. In August 
2014 they led not just thousands of their 
own supporters onto the streets, but fol-
lowers of ex-president Saleh as well. 
The balance of power in Sanaa 
During the political transformation, the 
balance of power among the Sanaa elites 
has changed as did the interests of the re-
gional powers, with both changes favouring 
the Houthi movement. The restructuring of 
the military as stipulated in the GCC agree-
ment – during which high-ranking officers 
were replaced – weakened the position of 
former president Saleh and led to a frag-
mentation of the security apparatus. On 
the other hand, it gave a political boost 
to the former opposition party Islah, which 
in turn led its opponents to back the Houthi 
movement as a counterbalance. The fact that 
Saudi Arabia withdrew its support from 
Islah during this phase gave the Houthis 
an advantage that enabled them to advance 
on the capital and trump Islah militarily. 
While Saudi Arabia’s influence in Yemen 
has noticeably waned, Iran has gained 
opportunities for expanding its influence 
through the advances of its allies, the 
Houthis. 
The growing power of the Houthis also 
created a convergence of interests with 
followers of ex-president Saleh, who have 
likewise positioned themselves against 
Islah and President Hadi. Many tribes sub-
sequently joined the Houthi movement or 
at least concluded non-aggression pacts. 
The tribes’ support, and the looting of the 
state arsenal, put weapons and equipment 
into the Houthis’ hands that made their 
armed victory possible. Substantial sections 
of the military did not intervene when the 
Houthis seized power, apparently approv-
ing of the movement’s mounting strength 
and the accompanying decline of Islah. 
The events also demonstrated ex-president 
Saleh’s continued influence over the armed 
forces: the army’s non-intervention worked 
in his interest. His followers hoped this 
might derail the transitional process, weaken 
Hadi, and eventually clear the path for their 
return to the highest political office. The 
Saleh family has, in fact, increasingly gar-
nered the support of a population faced with 
massive destabilization and social polariza-
tion into either followers or opponents of 
the Houthis. 
The undermining of the state 
The technocratic government sworn in on 
8 November 2014 on the basis of the Peace 
and National Partnership Agreement con-
sisted of well-known politicians from across 
the political spectrum as well as “new faces” 
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from civil society and the independent 
youth movement. While its composition 
made it look more promising than previous 
governments, it was unable to implement 
the reforms stipulated by the Agreement. 
The principal obstacles lay in the superior 
strength of the Houthis, widespread cor-
ruption, and the continuing violence 
throughout the country. 
It has since become clear that the Houthis 
were less and less inclined to share power, 
and that the government was unable to put 
a stop to their hollowing out of the state 
apparatus. Rather than withdrawing their 
militias from the capital as stipulated, the 
Houthis have instead dug in and taken over 
certain functions of the state, for instance 
by setting up checkpoints. They have also 
begun intervening in the affairs of state 
institutions. The state broadcasting station 
and the agencies for national and political 
security, among others, have been under 
Houthi control since 19 January. Since Sep-
tember 2014, they have also been trying to 
expand their control of the area south of 
Sanaa by force of arms. As it stands, they 
are facing a powerless state apparatus: the 
president stepped down on 22 January; 
the armed forces are fragmented; and par-
liament awaits its legitimization pending 
elections. 
Resistance from the South 
With its strongly tribal structure and Zaidi 
faith, the Houthi movement has encoun-
tered resistance especially in central and 
southern Yemen. A majority of the popu-
lation in those areas is not organized into 
tribes and follows the teachings of the Sha-
fiite school of legal thought in Sunni Islam. 
The growing resistance there unites the 
opponents of the Houthis ever more tightly, 
with the result that the lines between 
Hirak, the tribes, and AQAP are increasingly 
and perceptibly blurred. AQAP has estab-
lished itself above all in the South, but car-
ries out its attacks against the state appara-
tus not just there but in the whole country. 
On 22 January Hirak leaders from various 
provinces declared the South independent. 
This primarily symbolic act points to an es-
calation of the violence between the North 
and the South. 
Prospects 
By resigning, the Yemeni president and gov-
ernment have deprived the Houthis of the 
cover of legitimacy that had, until then, 
made their de-facto seizure of power pos-
sible. Despite the parties’ ongoing attempts 
to find a political solution, there is now a 
real and pressing danger that the Houthis 
will proceed unilaterally, which would 
cause violence throughout the country to 
escalate further. 
In the end, only the Yemeni stakeholders 
can lastingly counter the political crisis in 
Yemen, and then only through political 
action. Given the complex mesh of Yemeni 
actors, external military intervention is 
more likely to aggravate the situation. Since 
the international community no longer has 
any real influence on these stakeholders, it 
can only attempt to exert pressure by either 
approving or disapproving of specific Houthi 
actions. Germany and its partners therefore 
need to urge the Houthi movement to make 
real compromises; and they must reject its 
unilateralism. At the same time, they should 
insist that all stakeholders participate with-
in the framework of the existing political 
institutions. It is especially important to 
integrate the Hirak leaders so as to prevent 
further radicalization of that movement. 
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